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This document establishes that the result in "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" is robust to a
number of extensions.
1. Robustness: Longer Horizon & Alternative Degrees of Transparency
We will show that our result is robust in a number of di⁄erent directions. The ￿rst extension considers
the possibility that the game lasts arbitrarily long, but ￿nitely many periods. The next three extensions
are related to the degree of transparency of mechanisms. We have so far assumed that the seller observes
the message that the buyer submits to the mediator, ￿; the action that he chooses s; and whether trade
takes place or not. In the ￿rst extension we consider the case where the seller simply observes whether
trade took place or not. In the second extension we look at an intermediate case where the seller observes
the messages that the buyer submits to the mediator, and whether trade took place or not, but does not
observe the action chosen by the buyer. Finally we allow the seller to observe everything, that is the
message that the buyer submits to the mediator ￿; the recommendation that he receives from the mediator
n; the action he chooses s and whether trade took place or not. This is the maximal amount of information
that the seller can observe.
1.1 Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms for 2 < T < 1:
We proceed by induction and we obtain the characterization of sequentially optimal mechanisms for the
case that T > 2: The overall structure of the proof is as in the two-period case. Of course the execution
gets at times more involved and the notation a bit more cumbersome.
1Induction Hypothesis: Suppose that we have established that it is optimal to post a price if the
game lasts for T ￿ 1 periods. Then we will establish that the same is true if the game lasts for T periods.
Our initial point is again to establish that it is without any loss to consider the arti￿cial Program B
where we have replaced the type space with its convex hull. The analogue of Proposition 3 is :
Proposition A.2 Suppose that the value of Program A and Program B is the same if the game lasts
T ￿ 1 periods, then the value of Program A and Program B is the same if the game lasts T periods.
1.1.1 Revenue Maximizing PBE among 2-Option Mechanisms
We start by looking for a revenue maximizing allocation rule among the allocation rules implemented by a
strategy pro￿le of the class two-options at t = 1; price below the optimal at t = 2; and show that a revenue
maximizing allocation rule among this class is implemented by a PBE of the game where the seller posts
a price in each period. The seller proposes at t = 1 M1 = f(r;z);(1;z1)g; where r 2 [0;1] and z;z1 2 R.
The buyer￿ s strategy is as follows: types v 2 [a; ￿ v1) choose (r;z) and types in (￿ v1;b] choose (1;z1) at t = 1.
Finally type ￿ v1 is indi⁄erent between choosing: (r;z) at t = 1 and (1;z2) at t = 2 versus choosing (1;z1)
at t = 1; that is ￿ v1 =
z1￿z￿(1￿r)￿z2
1￿r￿(1￿r)￿ and may be randomizing at t = 1 between these contracts. By our
induction hypothesis at t = 2 after the history where the buyer chose (r;z) at t = 1 and no trade took
place, the seller chooses a sequence of prices z2;z3;:::;zT; such that z2 ￿ z2(￿ v1); where z2(￿ v1) would have
been the optimal price given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1): Such an assessment is not necessarily a PBE since the
seller after the history where the buyer chose (r;z) at t = 1; may be choosing a cut-o⁄ below the optimal
one at t = 2.




1￿￿ is indi⁄erent between choosing (r;z) at t = 1 and (1;zt)
at t; versus choosing (r;z) at t = 1; and (1;zt+1) at t + 1:
Sometimes it will be more convenient (but equivalent), to think of the seller as if he is choosing cuto⁄s
^ vt; t = 2;:::;T then to be choosing prices z2;z3;:::;zT.
The allocation rules implemented by such strategy pro￿les are of the form
p(v) = r for v 2 [a;zT(FT))
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿1 for v 2 [zT(FT); ^ vT￿1)
:::::
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿2 for v 2 [^ v3; ^ v2)
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [^ v2; ￿ v1)
p(v) = 1 for v 2 [￿ v1;b];
for some ￿ v1 2 [a;b]; r 2 [0;1]; z 2 R
; (1)
2with ^ v2 ￿ ￿ v2; where ￿ v2 is the optimal cut-o⁄ at t = 2 given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1); and where ^ vt is the
optimal cut-o⁄ at t given beliefs Ft(v) =
Ft￿1(v)
Ft￿1(^ vt￿1) for t = 3;:::;T.
De￿nition A.1 We call P￿
T the set of allocation rules that have the shape described in (1) for some
￿ v1 2 [a;b]; r 2 [0;1]; and ^ v2 ￿ v2(￿ v1); where v2(￿ v1) is the optimal cut-o⁄at t = 2 given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1).
We now turn to show that the revenue maximizing element of P￿
T can be implemented by a PBE of
the game where the seller posts a price in each period. For that we use a generalization of Lemma 2, in
the main text.
Lemma A.2 Let ￿ vT￿1 denote an optimal cut-o⁄ at T ￿ 1 given beliefs FT￿1(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ vT￿2) then it is
increasing in ￿ vT￿2:
Proof First recall from Lemma 2 that cut-o⁄ ￿ vT￿1 determines the optimal price in the ￿nal period of
the game zT: At the beginning of t = T ￿ 1 revenue given FT￿1(v) =
F(v)




[(F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿1))zT￿1 + (F(￿ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT))￿zT]:
Given that the buyer￿ s strategy is a best response it must hold that ￿ vT￿1 =
zT￿1￿￿zT(￿ vT￿1)
1￿￿ : From this we





(F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)￿ vT￿1 + ￿zT(￿ vT￿1))




F(￿ vT￿2) is a constant ￿ vT￿1 maximizes essentially the following expression:
RT￿1(￿ vT￿1;FT￿1) = (F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)￿ vT￿1 + ￿zT(￿ vT￿1))
+(F(￿ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT(￿ vT￿1)))￿zT(￿ vT￿1)
Now let ^ vT￿1 denote the optimal cut-o⁄ at t = T ￿1 given posterior FT￿1(v) =
F(v)
F(^ vT￿2) with ^ vT￿2 > ￿ vT￿2.
From the same arguments as before it follows that ^ vT￿2 maximizes
RT￿1(^ vT￿1; ^ FT￿1) = (F(^ vT￿2) ￿ F(^ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1))
+(F(^ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT(^ vT￿1)))￿zT(^ vT￿1);
and since ^ vT￿2 > ￿ vT￿2 this expression can be written as
RT￿1(^ vT￿1; ^ FT￿1) = (F(^ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿2))((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1))
+(F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(^ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1))
+(F(^ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT(^ vT￿1)))￿zT(^ vT￿1):
3We argue by contradiction. Suppose that ^ vT￿1 < ￿ vT￿1 then by Lemma 8 in the main text we also have
that zT(^ vT￿1) ￿ zT(￿ vT￿1): From these two observations it follows that
(F(^ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿2))((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1)) (2)
< (F(^ vT￿2) ￿ F(￿ vT￿2))((1 ￿ ￿)￿ vT￿1 + ￿zT(￿ vT￿1)):
Also observe that since ￿ vT￿1 is the optimal cut-o⁄ given beliefs FT￿1; then
(F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(^ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)￿ vT￿1 + ￿zT(￿ vT￿1)) + (F(￿ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT(￿ vT￿1)))￿zT(￿ vT￿1);
￿ (F(￿ vT￿2) ￿ F(^ vT￿1))((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1)) + (F(^ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT(^ vT￿1)))￿zT(^ vT￿1): (3)
Combining (2) and (3) we get that
RT￿1(￿ vT￿1; ^ FT￿1) > RT￿1(^ vT￿1; ^ FT￿1);
contradicting the optimality of ^ vT￿1:
Suppose that for all for t = ￿;:::;T; we have demonstrated that ￿ vt; denotes the optimal cut-o⁄ at t￿1
given beliefs Ft(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ vt￿1); is increasing in ￿ vt￿1: Then, we can use identical arguments as in Lemma A 2
to establish that:
Lemma A.3 Let ￿ vt+1 denote an optimal cut-o⁄ at t + 1 given beliefs Ft+1(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ vt) then for t =
2;:::;T ￿ 2 it is increasing in ￿ vt:
Proposition A.2 Let p￿ denote the solution of maxp2P￿
T R(p): Then p￿ can be implemented by a PBE
of the game where the seller posts a price in each period.
Proof. The seller￿ s can be also written in more traditional way as follows:
[1 ￿ F(￿ v1)]z1 + [F(￿ v1) ￿ F(￿ v2)]￿z2 + ::: + [F(￿ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT)]￿T￿1zT
By recursive substitutions we can write z0
ts solely as a function of v1;v2;:::;vT￿1 and r
zT￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1)
zT￿2 = (1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿2 + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1)]
zT￿3 = (1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿3 + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)^ vT￿1 + ￿zT(^ vT￿1))]
::::
z1 = [1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿] ￿ v1 + z + (1 ￿ r)￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)^ v2 + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)^ v3(^ v2) + ￿ [:::]]::::]:
Observe that after substituting these cuto⁄s in the objective function it becomes a linear function of r :




4then set r = 1; otherwise set r = 0:
Now it remains to show that at the optimum the seller will choose ^ v2 = ￿ v2: Note that the choice ^ v2
determines the posterior F3(v) =
F(v)
F(^ v2), which in turn determines F4 and so on:
Case 1: If r = 1 then the level of ^ v2 is irrelevant since the seller trades with all types with probability
1 at t = 1:
Case 2: If r = 0 then, since ^ v2 ￿ ￿ v2; by Lemma A.3 we also have that ^ vt ￿ ￿ vt; t = 3;:::;T ￿ 1 and
^ zT ￿ zT: From these observations we get that
[1 ￿ F(￿ v1)][(1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿) ￿ v1 + z + (1 ￿ r)￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ v2 + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ v3(￿ v2) + ￿ ():::)::::)] (4)
> [1 ￿ F(￿ v1)][(1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿) ￿ v1 + z + (1 ￿ r)￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)^ v2 + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)^ v3(^ v2) + ￿ ():::)::::)]:
Also since ￿ v2 solves the seller￿ s problem at the beginning of t = 2 given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1) we get:
1
F(￿ v1)
f[F(￿ v1) ￿ F(￿ v2)]z2 + [F(￿ v2) ￿ F(￿ v3)]￿z3 + [F(￿ v3) ￿ F(￿ v4)]￿2z4 +




f[F(￿ v1) ￿ F(^ v2)]z2 + [F(^ v2) ￿ F(^ v3)]￿z3 + [F(^ v3) ￿ F(^ v4)]￿2z4 (5)
+::: + [F(^ vT￿2) ￿ F(^ vT￿1)]￿T￿3zT￿1 + [F(^ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT￿1)]￿T￿2zTg;
but from (4) and (5) we obtain that
[1 ￿ F(￿ v1)][(1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿) ￿ v1 + z + (1 ￿ r)￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ v2 + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ v3(￿ v2) + ￿ ():::)::::)]
+::: +
+[F(￿ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT￿1)]￿T￿1zT
> [1 ￿ F(￿ v)][1 ￿ F(￿ v1)][(1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿) ￿ v1 + z + (1 ￿ r)￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)^ v2 + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)^ v3(^ v2) + ￿ ():::)::::)]
+::: +
+[F(^ vT￿1) ￿ F(zT￿1)]￿T￿1zT:
Hence at an optimum the seller will set ^ v2 equal to its optimal value at t = 2: From these arguments it
follows that the revenue maximizing allocation rule out of P￿
Tcan be implemented by a PBE of the game
where the seller posts a price in each period.
Summarizing, if the seller restricts attention to period one mechanisms that contain just two options:
one targeted to the ￿low￿ types (r;z) and one targeted to the ￿high￿ types, then at the optimum this
mechanism reduces to a posted price: the options available are (0;0) and (1;z1): Now we move on to
5provide necessary conditions that allocation rules satisfy if they are implemented by strategy pro￿les
where the seller employs arbitrary mechanisms at t = 1:
1.1.2 The General Case when 2 ￿ T < 1
As in the case of T = 2 we start by "drawing" the allocation from the lower end of types. Let s denote
an action that leads to a contract (r;z); that is the smallest probability contract that type a is "choosing"
with strictly positive probability at t = 1. Also let [a; ￿ v1] denote the convex hull of the set of types that
choose s; and hence (r;z); with strictly positive probability at t = 1: We will use the induction hypothesis
to establish necessary conditions that a PBE￿implementable allocation rule needs to satisfy if the game
lasts for T periods.
De￿nition A.2 An allocation rule is an element of PT if it satis￿es the following properties (i) in-
creasing in v on [a;b] (ii) 0 ￿ p(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 [a;b] and (iii)
p(v) = r for v 2 [a;zT(FT))
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿1 for v 2 (zT(FT); ￿ vT￿1)
:::::
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 (￿ v2; ￿ v1)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ p(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 [￿ v1;b]
;
for some ￿ v1 2 [a;b]; r 2 [0;1]; z 2 R and ￿ v2 optimally chosen given some posterior F2 whose support has
convex hull [a; ￿ v1], and where ￿ vt is optimally chosen given some posterior Ft(v) =
Ft￿1(v)
Ft￿1(￿ vt￿1) for t = 3;:::;T.
We can deduce by the monotonicity of p that its value for types on the boundaries of the various
subintervals will be somewhere in between the two steps, for instance p(zT(FT)) 2 (r;r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿1) or
p(￿ vT￿1) 2 (r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿1;r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿2): It is possible that there exists z^ t and some ^ t = 1;:::;T such
that z^ t ￿ a; in which case we have that p(a) 2 [r + (1 ￿ r)￿
^ t;r + (1 ￿ r)￿
^ t￿1):
Proposition A.3 Let p denote an allocation rule implemented by a PBE of the game, then p 2 PT.
Proof. Consider a PBE assessment (￿;￿) and let p denote the allocation rule implemented by it. Let s
denote an action that leads to a contract (r;z). This is the action that leads to the smallest ￿ r￿contract that
type a is choosing with positive probability at t = 1 or is indi⁄erent between choosing and not choosing.
Also let Y denote the subset of [a; ￿ v] that contains the types of the buyer that report message ￿ and choose
s at t = 1 with strictly positive probability, and let [a; ￿ v]; with a ￿ ￿ v; denote its convex hull. From our
induction hypothesis we have that after the history where (r;z) is chosen at t = 1 and no trade takes place
at t = 1, the seller will maximize revenue by posting a price in each period. Let us call this sequence of
6prices as zt; t = 2;::::;T and de￿ne
vL(t) = inf fv 2 Y s.t. v accepts zt at tg
vH(t) = supfv 2 Y s.t. v accepts zt at tg:
By de￿nition types vL(t) and vH(t) either choose (r;z) at t = 1 and accept zt at t with positive probability
or are indi⁄erent between this sequence of actions and the actions that they are actually choosing. The
proof is broken down into four steps.
Step 1: For v 2 (vL(t);vH(t)); where vL(t) 6= vH(t) we have that p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1: Suppose not,
then there exists v 2 (vL(t);vH(t)) such that p(v) 6= r+(1￿r)￿t￿1; that is it is either a) p(v) > r+(1￿r)￿t￿1
or b) p(v) < r+(1￿r)￿t￿1: If p(v) > r+(1￿r)￿t￿1 then type v must be choosing with positive probability
a sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p > r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1. At a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy
must be a best response hence it must be the case that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ (r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1)v ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1zt:
But now since ^ p > r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 it follows that ^ pvH(t) ￿ ^ x > (r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1)vH(t) ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1zt;
contradicting the fact that vH(t) chooses (r;z) at t = 1, (0;0) at t = 2;:::;t ￿ 1 and (1;zt) at t with
positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so: Now if p(v) < r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 then
type v is choosing at t = 1 with positive probability a sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that
^ p < r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 and because at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy is a best response then we have that
^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ (r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1)v ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1zt: But now since ^ p < r + (1 ￿ r)￿t and vL(t) < v it follows
that ^ pvL(t)￿ ^ x > (r +(1￿r)￿t￿1)vL(t)￿z ￿(1￿r)￿t￿1zt; contradicting the fact that vL(t) chooses (r;z)
at t = 1, (0;0) at t = 2;:::;t ￿ 1 and (1;zt) at t with positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing
and not doing so:
Step 2: The smallest type that accepts the price at t is indi⁄erent between accepting and rejecting,
that is
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿




r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
;
and for t = T this translates to zT = vL(T):
First observe that the fact that at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy must be a best response to the seller￿ s
strategy implies that
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿




r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
:
We now show that it must hold with equality. We argue by contradiction. Suppose not, that is
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿




r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
;
7then the seller can increase zt by ￿z such that
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿




r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
;
and raise higher revenue at the continuation game that starts at t: All types v 2 (vL(t);vH(t)) still prefer
to choose (1;zt) at t then to choose (0;0): Hence at a PBE we have that
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿




r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
: (6)
Step 3: For v < vL(t) we have that p(v) ￿ r + (1 ￿ r)￿t; for t = 2;:::;T ￿ 1:
We now demonstrate that p(v) ￿ r+(1￿r)￿t for all v < vL(t): We will argue by contradiction. Suppose
that there exists v < vL(t) such that p(v) > r+(1￿r)￿t: Note that since we are looking at a PBE it must
be the case that
p(v)v ￿ x(v) ￿
￿￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿￿
v ￿
￿




p(v) ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
v ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1
￿
￿ x(v):
Now since v < vL(t) and p(v) > r + (1 ￿ r)￿t we have that
￿
p(v) ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t￿
vL(t) > x(v) ￿ z ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1 or
p(v)vL(t) ￿ x(v) >
￿￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿￿
vL(t) ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿tzt+1)
or by (6)
p(v)vL(t) ￿ x(v) >
￿
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1￿
vL(t) ￿
￿
z + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1zt
￿
= p(vL(t))vL(t) ￿ x(vL(t)):
But then vL(t) can bene￿t by mimicking the behavior of v: Contradiction. Therefore p(v) ￿ r + (1 ￿ r)￿t
for all v < vL(t) and t = 1;:::;T ￿ 1: But from Step 1 we know that p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t for all v 2
(vL(t + 1);vH(t + 1)). Now by the monotonicity of p and because vL(t) ￿ vH(t + 1)1 we have that
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t for v 2 (vL(t + 1);vL(t)):
Step 4: For v 2 (a;vL(T)); where a 6= vL(T) we have that p(v) = r: Suppose not, then there exists
v 2 (a;vL(T)) such that p(v) 6= r; that is it is either a) p(v) > r or b) p(v) < r: If p(v) > r then type v
must be choosing with positive probability a sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p > r. At
1By the monotonicity of p it follows that the smallest type that accepts the price at t is weakly greater than the largest
type that accepts the price at t + 1:
8a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy must be a best response hence it must be the case that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ rv ￿ z: But
now since ^ p > r it follows that ^ pvL(T) ￿ ^ x > rvL(T) ￿ z; contradicting the fact that vL(T) chooses (r;z)
with positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so: Now if p(v) < r then type v is
choosing at t = 1 with positive probability a sequence of actions that implement ^ p; ^ x such that ^ p < r and
because at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy is a best response then we have that ^ pv ￿ ^ x ￿ rv ￿ z: But now
since ^ p < r and a < v it follows that ^ pa ￿ ^ x > ra ￿ z; contradicting the fact that a chooses (r;z) at t = 1
with positive probability or is indi⁄erent between doing and not doing so:
From the last two steps it follows then that p(v) = r+(1￿r)￿t for v 2 (vL(t+1);vL(t)); for t = 1;:::;T￿1
and p(v) = r; for v 2 [a;vL(T)): So for the case under consideration we have demonstrated that a PBE-
implementable allocation rule must belong in the set
p(v) = r for v 2 [a;zT(FT))
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿1 for v 2 (zT; ￿ vT￿1)
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿2 for v 2 (￿ vT￿1; ￿ vT￿2)
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿T￿3 for v 2 (￿ vT￿2; ￿ vT￿3)
:::::
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿2 for v 2 (￿ v3; ￿ v2)
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 (￿ v2; ￿ v1)
r + (1 ￿ r)￿ ￿ p(v) ￿ 1 for v 2 (￿ v1;b];
for some ￿ v1 2 [a;b]; r 2 [0;1]; z 2 R
:
Note that p(a) cannot be strictly less then r by the de￿nition of (r;z); (in order for p(a) ￿ r it must be the
case that type a is choosing a sequence of actions that implement ^ p < r; but this contradicts the de￿nition
of (r;z) which is the smallest "r" contract that type a chooses with positive probability at t = 1):
Corollary 1 Let [^ vL; ^ vH] denote the convex hull of types that choose a contract (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 with positive
probability. Then it must be the case that
p(v) = ^ r for v 2 [^ vL;zT(FT))
p(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿T￿1 for v 2 (zT(FT); ^ vT￿1)
:::::
p(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿ for v 2 (^ v2; ^ vH]
;
and ^ v2 optimally chosen given some posterior F2 whose support has convex hull [a; ￿ v1], and where ^ vt is
optimally chosen given some posterior Ft(v) =
Ft￿1(v)
Ft￿1(^ vt￿1) for t = 3;:::;T.
9The shape of PBE implementable allocation rules is actually quite unexpected. As in the case of
T = 2; the shape of allocation rules in PT is the same as the one we would get in a scenario where all
types in [a; ￿ v1) choose a contract (r;z) with probability one at t = 1; potentially only the location of the
cuto⁄s di⁄ers: if all types in [a; ￿ v1) choose (r;z) at t = 1 with probability one, then ￿ v2 must be optimally
chosen given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1); whereas now ￿ v2 must be optimally chosen given some posterior F2
whose support has convex hull [a; ￿ v1]:
Our objective is to establish that the best way to separate types in the ￿rst period is in two- groups:
low and high ones. As in the case of T = 2 we show that the seller does not bene￿t from observing cheap
messages and from allowing sophisticated strategies for the buyer.
Can the seller bene￿t from observing the cheap messages ￿?
Recall that it is possible that the buyer is reporting message ￿ and then choosing s and reporting ^ ￿ and
then choosing action s: Let ~ F2 denote the seller￿ s posterior after he observes (￿;s) and let ^ F2 denote the
seller￿ s posterior after she observes (^ ￿;s): Suppose that F2 denotes the seller￿ s posterior after she observes
only action s: Our objective is to compare ￿ v2(F2) with ￿ v2( ^ F2) and ￿ v2( ~ F2): First let us examine how ￿ v2( ^ F2)
and ￿ v2( ~ F2) relate to each other.
Lemma A.4 Consider a PBE and let ￿ v2( ~ F2); respectively ￿ v2( ^ F2); denote the cuto⁄s that the seller
will choose at t = 2 after a history where she observed ￿ and s; and ^ ￿ and s respectively. Then it must be
the case that ￿ v2( ~ F2) = ￿ v2( ^ F2):
Proof. Suppose not, and without any loss let ￿ v2( ~ F2) < ￿ v2( ^ F2): Now since ￿ v2( ~ F2) =
z2￿￿z3(￿ v2( ~ F2))
1￿￿ and z3 is
increasing in ￿ v2, we have that z2( ~ F2) < z2( ^ F2): Then for all v 2 V it holds that
[r(s) + (1 ￿ r(s))￿]v ￿
h
z ￿ (1 ￿ r(s))￿z2( ~ F2)
i
> [r(s) + (1 ￿ r(s))￿]v ￿
h
z ￿ (1 ￿ r(s))￿z2( ^ F2)
i
;
hence for all v 2 [z2( ~ F2);b] the buyer strictly prefers to report ￿ instead of ^ ￿; at least for the portion
of the time that those types plan to chose s: But then when the seller sees ^ ￿ and s; she can infer that
the valuation of the buyer is below z2( ~ F2); which in turn implies that a price of z2( ^ F2) > z2( ~ F2) cannot
be optimal. Contradiction. Hence given some mechanism and a communication strategy the choice of s
uniquely determines the optimal price at t = T:
Now we turn to investigate the relationship of ￿ v2(F2) with ￿ v2( ^ F2) and ￿ v2( ~ F2): Using a procedure identical
to the one employed to prove Lemma 4 in the main text we obtain that:
Lemma A.5 "Cheap" information in ￿0s does not lead to higher prices at t = 2; the cuto⁄ ￿ v2(F2) ￿
￿ v2( ~ F2) = ￿ v2( ^ F2):
10Using Lemma A.5 one can establish an analogue Lemma 5 which states that it is without any loss to
view mechanisms to a set of contracts.
Does the seller bene￿t from "sophisticated" strategies of the buyer?
In order to investigate this question, we need to ￿nd out which types may be choosing a contract (r;z)
with positive probability, ((r;z) is again the smallest \r" contract that type a is choosing with strictly
positive probability at t = 1; or is indi⁄erent between choosing or not): As in the case of T = 2 we
establish that only types in [￿ v2; ￿ v1] may be choosing a contract other than (r;z):
Lemma A.6 Consider a PBE where [a; ￿ v1]; denotes the convex hull of the set of types that choose
(r;z) with positive probability at t = 1: Also let ￿ v2 denote the cut-o⁄ that the seller will chose at t = 2
after the history that the buyer chose (r;z) at t = 1 and no trade took place. Then only types in [￿ v2; ￿ v1]
may be choosing a contract di⁄erent from (r;z) with positive probability at t = 1:
Proof. We will argue by contradiction. Suppose that there exist v 2 [a; ￿ v2) choosing a contract (^ r; ^ z)
di⁄erent from (r;z) with positive probability at t = 1:
Claim 1: The convex hull of the set of types that choose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 cannot be a singleton.
If there is just one type, call it ^ v 2 [a; ￿ v1); choosing contract (^ r; ^ z) with positive probability at t = 1;
then it must be the case that when the seller observes (^ r; ^ z) chosen at t = 1 and no trade taking place,
then she can ￿gure out that the valuation of the buyer is equal to ^ v and hence she will post a price equal
to ^ v and the buyer will accept. In other words we will have that
p(^ v)^ v ￿ x(^ v) = (^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿)^ v ￿ (z + (1 ￿ r)￿^ v) = ^ rv ￿ ^ z:
We will show that this is impossible. From the fact that (r;z) is the smallest r contract that type a is
choosing with positive probability at t = 1 we have that ^ r > r: Otherwise type a would have a pro￿table
deviation. To see this, note that because type ^ v is choosing contract (^ r; ^ z) we have that
^ r^ v ￿ ^ z ￿ p(a)^ v ￿ x(a):
If p(a) = r and ^ r < r then
^ ra ￿ ^ z > p(a)a ￿ x(a):
If p(a) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1; for some t, (which arises is zt < a for all t = 1;:::;T) then it must then be the
case that ^ r ￿ r +(1￿r)￿t; otherwise, that is if ^ r < r +(1￿r)￿t type a would have a pro￿table deviation.
We have therefore demonstrated that ^ r > r: Now from Proposition 9 we know that p(v) ￿ r +(1￿r)￿ for
v 2 [a; ￿ v1) and from the previous observation we have that r + (1 ￿ r)￿ < ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿: This together with
the monotonicity of p which imply that ^ v cannot be an element of [a; ￿ v1):
11Claim 2: Let (^ vL; ^ vH) denote the convex hull of the set of types that choose contract (^ r; ^ z) with
positive probability. Then we will show that it must be the case that (^ vL; ^ vH) must be contained in one of
the subintervals (^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (zT; ￿ vT￿1) or (^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); for some t = 2;::::;T ￿ 1:
Our objective is to show that the only equilibrium feasible case is when either (^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (zT; ￿ vT￿1)
or (^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1) holds. Suppose not, then it must be the case that (^ vL; ^ vH) has a non-empty
intersection with two consecutive intervals, say (￿ vt+1; ￿ vt) and (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); but then by Proposition 9 and
Corollary 1 we know that it must be the case
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt+1; ￿ vt) and
p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); (7)
but since some of these types are choosing a contract (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 with positive probability, then it must
also be the case that either
p(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿
^ t for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt+1; ￿ vt) and
p(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿
^ t￿1 for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); (8)
for some ^ t = 1;::::;T ￿ 1; or
p(v) = ^ r for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt+1; ￿ vt) and
p(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿T￿1 for v 2 (^ vL; ^ vH) \ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1) (9)
Now combining (7) and (8) we have that the following must be true
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿
^ t￿1
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿
^ t
from the ￿rst equality we have that
r(1 ￿ ￿t￿1) = ^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1) + ￿
^ t￿1
r(1 ￿ ￿t￿1) = ^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1) + ￿
^ t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1
r =
^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1) + ￿
^ t￿1 ￿ ￿t￿1
(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
;
now substituting this expression in the second equality we get that
^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1) + ￿




(1 ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1) ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿t￿1
(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
!
￿t = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿
^ t
^ r(1 ￿ ￿








(1 ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿t￿1
(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
!
￿t = ^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t) + ￿
^ t
12^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1)(1 ￿ ￿t)
(1 ￿ ￿t￿1)
￿ ^ r(1 ￿ ￿
^ t) = ￿
^ t ￿
￿




(1 ￿ ￿t￿1) ￿ ￿






1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿
^ t￿1￿t ￿ 1 + ￿






^ t ￿ ￿
^ t￿t￿1 ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t + ￿t￿t￿1 + ￿t￿





^ t￿1 + ￿





^ t ￿ ￿




^ t ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t
￿￿t ￿ ￿
^ t￿1 + ￿
^ t + ￿t￿1 = 1;
hence the desired condition holds only for ^ r = 1￿ using reverse steps we can also show that in order that
the desired equalities hold it must be the case that
r = 1;
but then r = ^ r contradicting the supposition that types in (^ vL; ^ vH) choose a contract (^ r; ^ z) (di⁄erent from
contract (r;z)) with positive probability.
Now let us examine the other possibility. From (7) and (9) it follows that we must have
^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿T￿1 = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1 and
^ r = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t
Substituting the second expression into the ￿rst we get that
r + (1 ￿ r)￿t + (1 ￿ r ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿t)￿T￿1 = r + (1 ￿ r)￿t￿1
￿r￿t + r￿t￿1 ￿ r￿T￿1 + r￿t￿T￿1 = ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿T￿1 + ￿t￿T￿1
r =
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿T￿1 + ￿t￿T￿1
￿t￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿T￿1 + ￿t￿T￿1 = 1;
which is impossible for the same reasons as before. Hence the only feasible scenario is that the convex
hull of the set of types that are choosing some contract (^ r; ^ z) with positive probability must be either
(^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (zT; ￿ vT￿1) or (^ vL; ^ vH) ￿ (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); which completes what we wanted to show.
13Claim 3: Claim 2 is impossible.
From Claim 2 we know that all the types that choose ^ r with positive probability must be contained in
(￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1). Then it must be the case that the price that the seller will post at t = 2 after the history that
the buyer chose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 and no trade took place must be in (￿ vt; ￿ vt￿1); but then ^ p = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿;
which is impossible for the reasons explained in the proof of Claim 1.
Hence only types in (v2; ￿ v1) may be choosing some contract other than contract (r;z) with positive
probability, the reason why this is possible for those types is because we have no restrictions on the shape
of the allocation rule for types in [￿ v1;b]:
Let m(v) denote the probability that type v is choosing a contract (r;z): We assume that m is a mea-
surable function of v: A consequence of Lemma A.6 is that even if we allow for any possible randomization,















￿ v2 m(s)dF(s); v 2 [￿ v2; ￿ v1];
(10)
when ￿ v2 > 0: Suppose that the posterior at t = 2 is given by (10); m(s) 2 [0;1]; and let ￿ vm
2 denote an
optimal cut-o⁄ at t = 2 given beliefs Fm
2 (v): Also let ￿ v2 denote an optimal cut-o⁄ at t = 2 given beliefs
F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1): The result that follows states that ￿ v2 ￿ ￿ vm
2 . The reason for this is that from Lemma A.6
we know that only types above ￿ v2 may be actually choosing some contact other than (r;z) with positive
probability.
Lemma A.7 ￿ v2 ￿ ￿ vm
2 :
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that ￿ v2 < ￿ vm
2 : From Lemmata A.2 and A.3 it follows that
￿ v3(￿ v2) ￿ ￿ v3(￿ vm
2 );::; ￿ vT￿1(￿ vT￿2) ￿ ￿ vT￿1(￿ vm
T￿2);zT(vT￿1) ￿ zT(vm
T￿1)
Since ￿ v2 is the optimal cut-o⁄ given beliefs F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v1); the di⁄erence in expected revenue with cut-o⁄
￿ v2 and cut-o⁄ ￿ vm





























































































































contradicting the optimality ￿ vm
2 .
Given Lemmata A.5 and A.7 the result follows exactly as in Theorem 1.
Theorem A.3 Suppose that T < 1: Then, under non-commitment the seller maximizes expected
revenue by posting a price in each period.
Proof. The result can be established following the exact lines of the proof of Proposition 5: For each
allocation rule in PT we can construct an allocation rule in P￿
T that generates higher expected revenue for
the seller. As in the proof of Proposition 5 we ignore all sequential rationality constraints and chose p in
the range [￿ v1;b] optimally, respecting only the requirement that p is monotonic. We get that
^ p(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [￿ v1;v￿￿)
^ p(v) = 1 for v 2 [v￿￿;b];
where v￿￿ is given by (11, main text). From Lemmata A.5 and A.7 we have that v2 ￿ ￿ v2(￿ v1) and from
Lemma A.3 we have that v2(￿ v1) ￿ v2(v￿￿). From the last two inequalities we get that v2 ￿ v2(v￿￿): The
optimal allocation rule is an element of P￿
T: From Proposition A.2 we know that the revenue maximizing
allocation rule is implemented by a PBE of the game where the seller posts a price in each period.
1.2 Alternative Degrees of Transparency
In the next three units we establish that our result is robust to a number of alternative assumptions
regarding the degree of transparency of mechanisms.
151.3 Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms with Minimal Amount of Information
Suppose that all that the seller observes is whether the buyer obtained the object or not. Then at t = 2
after the history where no trade took place at t = 1 the seller￿ s beliefs will be the same irrespective of
the actions and the exchange of messages that took place at t = 1: We show that if an allocation rule is
implemented by a PBE of the game where the seller simply observes whether trade took place or not,
then it can be written as a linear combination of allocation rules in (12) in the main text. We sketch the
main two steps required to establish this.
Let [a; ￿ v]; with a < ￿ v; denote the convex hull of the set of types that at t = 1 choose with positive
probability actions that lead with strictly positive probability to no-trade.2Those types choose actions
that lead to contracts of the following form: (r1;z1);(r2;z2);(r3;z3);::::;(rk;zk); where ri < 1; i = 1;::;k:3
Since the seller does not observe any of this and the only information she obtains is whether trade took
place or not, she will post the same price at t = 2 irrespective of the actions and the messages chosen
by the buyer. Let ^ z denote the price that the seller will post at t = 2, after the history of no trade
at t = 1: Now the fact that at a PBE the buyer￿ s strategy has to be a best response at each node
implies that types above ^ z will be accepting this price at t = 2: For v 2 [^ z; ￿ v] we must then have that
p(v) = ri +(1￿ri)￿ = ri +￿￿￿ri = (1￿￿)ri +￿; which is increasing in ri: Hence by the monotonicity of p
we have that higher types are choosing higher probability contracts at t = 1: This in turn implies that the
seller￿ s beliefs assign weakly less weight to types closer to ￿ v then to types closer to ^ z: This observation is
formalized in the proof of Lemma A.1, that follows, where we establish that ^ z ￿ z2(￿ v); (again z2(￿ v) is the
price that will be optimal if the posterior is given by F2(v) =
F(v)
F(￿ v):) With some abuse of notation let r(v),
z(v) denote the contract that is chosen by type v at t = 1: Then after the history where no trade took






a (1￿r(s))dF(s) > 0
because a < ￿ v and (1 ￿ r(s)) > 0 for all s 2 [a; ￿ v]:





have that ^ z2 ￿ z2(￿ v):
Proof. The price at t = 2 is given by
z2 ￿ inf
￿



















v [1 ￿ F2(t)]dt can be
2If a = ￿ v then the seller￿ s problem at t = 2 is trivial: she will post a price equal to ￿ v:




a (1 ￿ r(s))dF(s)
￿Z ~ v
v















a (1 ￿ r(s))dF(s)
￿Z ~ v
v









and z2 can be equivalently be de￿ned as
z2 ￿ inf
(
v 2 [a; ￿ v] such that
R ~ v




t (1 ￿ r(s))dF(s)
￿
dt ￿ 0;
for all ~ v 2 [v;b]
)
:
Our objective is to establish that ^ z ￿ z2(￿ v): We will argue by contradiction. Suppose that ^ z > z2(￿ v);



































Now we will show that we can break the interval [z2(￿ v); ~ v] into subintervals of types that choose actions
that lead to the same contracts at t = 1: We do this by establishing that the set of types that choose
actions that lead to the same contract is convex. In particular we show that if (v; ￿ v) is the convex hull
of the set of types that choose the same action at t = 1; than types in (v; ￿ v) can be only randomizing at
t = 1 among actions that lead to the same contract. If a type in (v; ￿ v) is randomizing between di⁄erent
sequences of actions it must be the case that p = ^ p and x = ^ x: Recall that after the history of no trade
the seller posts a price ^ z at t = 2. Then best response constraints at t = 2 imply that types above ^ z are
accepting the price that the seller posts at t = 2: This in turn implies that if a type above ^ z is randomizing
among actions that lead to di⁄erent contracts, then it must be the case that p = ~ p; which implies that
(1￿￿)ri+￿ = (1￿￿)~ ri+￿ and x = ~ x which implies that zi+(1￿ri)￿^ z = ~ zi+(1￿~ ri)￿^ z: But then from the
last two observations we have that ri = ~ ri and zi = ~ zi; which is clearly the same contract. Now for types
below ^ z if there are randomizing between di⁄erent actions at t = 1 it immediately follows that ri = ~ ri and
zi = ~ zi: Hence the buyer can be only randomizing among actions that lead to the same contract.
17Suppose that types in subinterval [z2(￿ v); ^ v1] choose actions that lead to some contract (r1;z1), types
in subinterval [^ v1; ^ v2] choose actions that lead to contract (r2;z2) and so forth. Given this observation the
right hand side of (11) can be rewritten as
Z ^ v1
z2(￿ v)































Now by the de￿nition of z2(￿ v) we have that
Z ^ v1
z2(￿ v)





















If Z ^ v2
^ v1








then we have that
Z ^ v1
z2(￿ v)



















otherwise, that is if Z ^ v2
^ v1








18then we have that
Z ^ v1
z2(￿ v)









































this inequality is due to (1 ￿ r2) ￿ (1 ￿ r1); which follows by the monotonicity of r; (see main text), and
the fact that
R ^ v1




t (1 ￿ r1)dF(s)
￿
dt ￿ 0; but then again by the de￿nition of
z2(￿ v) it follows that
Z ^ v1
z2(￿ v)



















Continuing in a similar fashion we can show that the right hand side of (11) is greater than zero. Contra-
diction. We have therefore established that ^ z ￿ z2(￿ v):
Now, given Lemma A.1 , we now argue, somewhat informally, that allocation rules implemented by an
assessment where the seller obtains minimal amount of information, can be written as a linear combination
of allocation rules in (12) in the main text. Let rL;zL and rH;zH denote respectively the smaller and the
larger probability contracts that are chosen with strictly positive probability at t = 1 by types in [a; ￿ v]:
Since the seller in the scenario under consideration merely observes whether trade took place or not, then
the price at t = 2 is independent of the buyer￿ s choice at t = 1: From Lemma A.1 we have that ^ z ￿ z2(￿ v).
Then an allocation rule implemented by a PBE where the seller observes only whether trade took place
at t = 1 or not, can be written as a linear combination of the following two allocation rules:
p(v) = rL for v 2 [a; ^ z)
p(v) = rL + (1 ￿ rL) for v 2 [^ z; ￿ v)
p(v) = 1 for v 2 [￿ v;b]
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p(v) = rH for v 2 [a; ^ z)
p(v) = rH + (1 ￿ rH) for v 2 [^ z; ￿ v)
p(v) = 1 for v 2 [￿ v;b]:
We call the set of allocation rules implemented by PBE0s where the seller no information ￿ P2: Take an
element of ￿ P2; call it ￿ p: Since ￿ p is a linear combination of elements4 of P2; call them pi; i = 1;:::;n and
because expected revenue R is linear in p; (see (8), main text); it can be written as
R(￿ p) = R(￿L
i=1￿ipi) = ￿L
i=1￿iR(pi):
Now we know by the proof of Theorem 1, main text that each element of P2 is dominated in terms of
expected revenue by an element of P￿
2: Let us call p￿
i the element of P￿
2 that dominates pi; then we have
that




where p￿ 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;ng R(p￿
i): It follows that each element of ￿ P2 is dominated in terms of expected
revenue by an element of P￿
2:
Theorem A.2 Suppose that the seller observes only whether trade takes place or not. Then under
non-commitment the seller maximizes expected revenue by posting a price in each period.
1.4 Intermediate Amount of Information: Seller observes only "cheap" messages and trade/no
trade
Here we look at an intermediate case where the seller observes the messages that the buyer submits to
the mediator and whether trade took place or, but does not observe the action chosen by the buyer. In
this environment where the interests of the buyer and the seller are directly opposite, allowing the seller
to observe apart from whether trade took place or not, the cheap messages submitted by the buyer is
redundant. Let￿ s see why. Suppose that the seller observes the reports the buyer sends to the mediator as
well as whether trade took place or not. Based on the information that the seller observes at t = 1 she
will post a price at t = 2: Given that the "cheap" message of the buyer at t = 1 in￿ uences only the seller￿ s
beliefs at t = 2 and nothing at t = 1; all types of the buyer prefer the message that will lead to the lowest
price at t = 2: Hence all types will then choose the same "cheap" message, which implies that the possibility
that the seller observes the cheap messages, on top of whether trade takes place or not, does not add any
4We assume that they are ￿nitely many for simplicity.
20information. What about now if the seller observes the recommendation that the buyer receives from the
mediator? Again as before n0s may play the role of coordination to particular continuation equilibria.
Each ￿ induces a probability distribution over n0s and each of these n0s coordinates to a particular t = 2
price. It follows that all types prefer to choose the message ￿ that leads to the lowest expected t = 2 price.
Hence still all types of the buyer choose the same ￿:
1.5 Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms with Maximal Amount of Information
What is a revenue maximizing PBE if we allow the seller to observe also the recommendation that the
buyer receives from the mediator, n? The ￿rst step in ￿nding an optimal allocation is to derive the set of
PBE￿implementable allocation rules. In order to do so, we investigate the role of the recommendations
that the buyer receives from the mediator. We argue that n0s play a role of a coordination device to
a particular "continuation" equilibrium. A continuation equilibrium in this setup is an assessment, that
conditional on a given message submitted by the buyer to the mediator, and on the recommendation that
the buyer receives from the mediator, satis￿es the requirements of PBE: We illustrate this role of n0s with
an example.
Example 1 Consider a PBE where the mechanism that the seller employs at t = 1 consists of a game
form that contains two actions s and ^ s such that when s is chosen the contract is (r;z) and when ^ s is
chosen the contract is (^ r; ^ z): These two contracts are such that the following inequalities are true
r < ^ r < r + (1 ￿ r)￿ < ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿:
In order to complete the description of a mechanism let us describe the mediator: it allows the report of
a single message ￿: Given ￿ it sends recommendation n1 with probability a half and recommendation n2
with probability a half. There are many possible allocation rules implemented by "continuation equilibria"
where the seller employs this game form at t = 1: Two possibilities are as follows: 1) all types below
￿ v =
^ z+(1￿^ r)￿^ z2￿z￿(1￿r)￿z2(￿ v)
^ r+(1￿^ r)￿￿(r+(1￿r)￿) choose (r;z) and all types above ￿ v choose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 and 2) all types below
~ v =
^ z+(1￿^ r)￿^ z2￿z￿(1￿r)￿z2(~ v)
^ r+(1￿^ r)￿￿(r+(1￿r)￿) choose (r;z) and all types above ~ v choose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1; where we take ￿ v < ~ v:
Then consider an assessment where when the recommendation is n1 the buyer￿ s strategy is such that types
above ￿ v choose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 and types below ￿ v choose (r;z) at t = 1; whereas when the recommendation
is n2 the buyer￿ s strategy is such that types above ~ v choose (^ r; ^ z) at t = 1 and types below ~ v choose (r;z)
at t = 1: Then, from the ex-ante point of view the allocation rule will be of the form p(￿;n1) times the
21probability that the buyer will receive recommendation n1; where
p(￿;n1)(v) = r for v 2 [a;z2(￿ v))
p(￿;n1)(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [z2(￿ v); ￿ v)
p(￿;n1)(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿ for v 2 [￿ v;b];
and it will be of the form p(￿;n2) times the probability that the buyer will receive recommendation n2
p(￿;n2)(v) = r for v 2 [a;z2(~ v))
p(￿;n2)(v) = r + (1 ￿ r)￿ for v 2 [z2(~ v); ~ v)
p(￿;n2)(v) = ^ r + (1 ￿ ^ r)￿ for v 2 [~ v;b]:
This example, though admittedly simplistic, demonstrates the role of n0s as a coordination device on
a particular continuation equilibrium. It also illustrates, that it is possible that given a message that the
buyer submits to the mediator, ￿; a given action chosen by the buyer s is followed by di⁄erent prices at
t = 2 depending on the recommendation that buyer received by the mediator. That is, it is possible that
z2(~ v) > z2(￿ v): This is contrary to Lemma 4, in the main text, which says that if the seller does not observe
n, it cannot be the case that depending on the message that the buyer submitted to the mediator, a given
action of the buyer at t = 1 is followed by di⁄erent prices at t = 2.
In general, matters are quite more complicated since the message that the buyer submits to the mediator
￿ in￿ uences the probability distribution over the recommendations that he receives, and consequently the
continuation allocations. Before we proceed to describe necessary conditions that allocation rules satisfy
if they are implemented by assessments where the seller observes the recommendations by the mediator,
we would like to note that allowing for the possibility that the seller observes the recommendations of the
mediator has the same e⁄ect as allowing the seller to submit messages to the mediator, if these messages
can be observed by the buyer; they both function as a way to coordinate on a speci￿c "continuation
equilibrium."
Proposition A.1 Suppose that T = 2 and that the seller observes the message that the buyer sends
to the mediator, the recommendation that the buyer receives from n the mediator, the action he chooses,
and whether trade took place or not. Then, if an allocation rule is implemented by an assessment that is
a PBE, it can be written as a linear combination of allocation rules described in (12) in the main text.
Proof. A given report by the buyer to the mediator ￿ induces a probability distribution over recommen-
dations n0s: The recommendations n0s play a role as a belief￿ s coordination device: each pair of cheap
signals (￿i;nj) determines a continuation assessment and an allocation rule that has the shape of the ones
22in (12), main text. When the valuation of the buyer is v then, the probability that p(￿i;nj)(v) is the
relevant allocation rule is given by the probability that type v will report message ￿ times the probability
that the mediator will send recommendation n given message ￿; and p(v) is then the expectation with
respect to all pairs (￿;n): It follows that in the case that the seller observes the recommendations that the
buyer receives by the mediator, the allocation rule is a linear combination of allocation rules in (12) in the
main text.
But again from Proposition 4 we have that a revenue maximizing element of P￿
2 is implemented by a
PBE of the game where the seller posts a price in each period. We have therefore demonstrated that:
Theorem A.1 Suppose that T = 2 and that the seller observes the message that the buyer sends to
the mediator, the recommendation that the buyer receives from the mediator, the action he chooses, and
whether trade took place or not. Then under non-commitment the seller maximizes expected revenue by
posting a price in each period.
Let us conclude our exploration of the various environments where our result is robust with a ￿nal
remark. Given that the seller employs deterministic game forms all the earlier analysis goes through
assuming that the seller instead of actions, the s0s; observes contracts (r;z):
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